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We present two schemes for multiparty quantum remote secret conference in which each legiti-
mate conferee can read out securely the secret message announced by another one, but a vicious
eavesdropper can get nothing about it. The first one is based on the same key shared efficiently
and securely by all the parties with Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states, and each conferee
sends his secret message to the others with one-time pad crypto-system. The other one is based on
quantum encryption with a quantum key, a sequence of GHZ states shared among all the conferees
and used repeatedly after confirming their security. Both these schemes are optimal as their intrinsic
efficiency for qubits approaches the maximal value.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
Quantum communication supplies some novel ways for
transmitting message securely. For example, quantum
key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], the original ap-
plication of quantum mechanics, can be used to create a
private key between two authorized users, Alice and Bob.
The noncloning theorem forbids a vicious eavesdropper,
say Eve to copy an unknown quantum state without
disturbing it. By analysing the error rate of samples
chosen randomly, Alice and Bob can determine whether
there is an eavesdropper in the quantum line [1]. With
quantum secret sharing (QSS) [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13],
a boss can generate a private key with his agents, i.e.,
KA = KB ⊕KC ⊕KD ⊕ · · ·. Here KA is the key of the
boss Alice, Ki (i = B,C,D, · · ·) are the keys of Alice’s
agents. In this way, Alice can send her secret message
to her agents who can read out it if and only if they co-
operate, otherwise none can obtain a useful information
about the message. Also, QSS provides a secure way for
sharing an unknown state [14, 15, 16, 17].
Recently, a new branch of quantum communication,
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) was pro-
posed and has been actively pursued [18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. QSDC makes a party commu-
nicate another one directly and securely, different from
QKD. In detail, the sender sends his secret message di-
rectly to the receiver without creating a private key and
then encrypting the message with it. As pointed out in
Ref. [30], a secure quantum direct communication proto-
col requires the users to transmit the quantum states in a
date block. Moreover, the two legitimate users can detect
the eavesdropper before they encode the secret message
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on the quantum states, and can read out the message di-
rectly without exchanging an additional classical bit for
each qubit except for those used for checking eavesdrop-
ping. In this way, the two-step QSDC protocol [18] and
the quantum one-time pad QSDC protocol [19] proposed
by Deng et al. satisfy all the requirements. So do the pro-
tocol with quantum superdense coding [20] and that with
multi-particle Green-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state [21].
Another class of quantum communication protocols
used to transmit secret message is called deterministic
secure quantum communication (DSQC) [31], such as
the schemes [22, 23] with quantum teleportation and en-
tanglement swapping, and those [25, 26] based on secret
transmitting order of particles. Although the secret mes-
sage can be read out only after the two authorized users
exchange an additional classical bit for each qubit, none
of the users needs to transmit the qubits that carry the
secret message, which maybe make those protocols more
secure than others in a noise channel and more conve-
nient for quantum error correction [31]. In particular,
we introduced a DSQC protocol with only single-photon
measurements and a feasible quantum signal, nonmaxi-
mally entangled states [31].
More recently, two novel concepts for direct commu-
nication are proposed. One is quantum secret report in
which many agents report directly their secret messages
to a boss in one-way direction [32]. The other is quantum
broadcast communication [33] with which one can broad-
cast his secret message to many legitimate receivers. In
this Letter, we will present two schemes for multiparty
quantum remote secret conference (MQRSC) in which
any legitimate conferee can send securely his secret mes-
sage to the other legitimate parties who participate in a
remote secret conference, but a vicious eavesdropper can
get nothing about the messages. The first one is based on
the same classical key shared efficiently and privately by
all the parties with Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ)
states. The other one is based on quantum encryption
2with a quantum key, a sequence of GHZ states shared
among all the parties and used repeatedly after confirm-
ing their security.
Now, let us describe the principle of our MQRSC pro-
tocol based on the same private key shared by all the
parties of the secret conference. Suppose there are three
remote conferees, say Alice, Bob and Charlie. They first
share the same key, say KA = KB = KC securely and
then use them to encrypt their secret messages with clas-
sical one time-pad crypto-system. Here KA, KB and KC
are the classical keys obtained by Alice, Bob and Charlie,
respectively. In detail, they can use some three-particle
GHZ states to create their keys efficiently. The GHZ-
state is
|ψ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC ,
=
1√
2
[(|+ x〉A|+ x〉B + | − x〉A| − x〉B)|+ x〉C
+(|+ x〉A| − x〉B + | − x〉A|+ x〉B)| − x〉C .
(1)
Here |0〉 = |+z〉 and |1〉 = |−z〉 are the eigenvectors of the
measuring basis (MB) σz , and |+ x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and
| − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) are those of the MB σx. That is, a
remote conferee, say Alice prepares a three-particle quan-
tum system in the GHZ state |ψ〉ABC , and then sends the
particle B to Bob and the particle C to Charlie. All the
three conferees choose the MBs σz and σx with the prob-
abilities 1 − p and p to measure their particles. After
comparing in public their MBs, the three conferees keep
their outcomes obtained when they all choose the MB
σz or the MB σx. The probabilities that they obtain a
correlated result with the MBs σz and σx are (1 − p)3
and p3, respectively.
Alice, Bob and Charlie choose all the outcomes ob-
tained with the MB σx and a subset of those with the
MB σz as the samples to analyse the security of the
transmission, similar to Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992
(BBM92) QKD protocol [3] and the modified Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD protocol [5]. If the trans-
mission is secure, the three conferees can get the same
private key by distilling the remaining outcomes obtained
with the MB σz . Assume that the ratio of the number of
sample particles to that of particles transmitted is r. As
the symmetry, p3 = r/2 (half of the samples are the out-
comes obtained by the conferees with the MB σx). Then
the probability that the three remote conferees obtain
their raw key, prk without eavesdropping is
prk = (1− 3
√
r
2
)3ptpd, (2)
where pt and pd are the probabilities of the transmission
and the detectors, respectively.
In essence, this MQRSC protocol is just a special QKD
protocol. That is, all the conferees generate first the same
private key with GHZ states efficiently and then use it to
encrypt and decrypt their messages. Different from QSS
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], all the authorized conferees are
honest. They can take the measurement with the MB σz
on the GHZ states to obtain the same outcomes, and use
all the outcomes obtained with the MB σx as the samples
for eavesdropping check.
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FIG. 1: The principle of the multiparty quantum remote
secret conference scheme based on quantum encryption with
GHZ states. CNOT: controlled not gate.
With quantum memory [34], we can modify this
MQRSC protocol to transmit the secret message directly
and securely, without generating the same private classi-
cal key and then encrypt the message, similar to QSDC
[18, 19, 20, 21]. To this end, the three conferees, Alice,
Bob and Charlie, first share a sequence of three-particle
GHZ states |ψ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉)ABC , and then
use them as a quantum key for encrypting and decrypting
the secret message transmitted. We give out all the steps
for this multiparty quantum remote secret conference as
follows.
(1) The three conferees, Alice, Bob and Charlie, share
a sequence of three-particle GHZ-state quantum systems
in the same state |ψ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉)ABC se-
curely, i.e., ordered N GHZ-state tripartite quantum
systems. In detail, one of the three conferees, say Al-
ice, prepares a sequence of three-particle GHZ states
|ψ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉+|111〉)ABC. For each GHZ state, Al-
ice sends the particle Bj (j = 1, 2, . . . , N) to Bob and the
particle Cj to Charlie, respectively. For checking eaves-
dropping, Alice chooses randomly some of the GHZ states
as their samples, and requires Bob and Charlie to mea-
sure their correlated particles by choosing randomly the
MB σx or the MB σy . Also Bob and Charlie announce in
public their MBs and the outcomes of the measurements.
Here | + y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉) and | − y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉),
i.e.,
|ψ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC ,
3=
1√
2
[(|+ y〉A| − y〉B + | − y〉A|+ y〉B)|+ x〉C
+(|+ y〉A|+ y〉B + | − y〉A| − y〉B)| − x〉C .
(3)
When both Bob and Charlie choose the MB σx or the
MB σy, Alice chooses the MB σx to measure her particle
A as well, otherwise, Alice measures her particle with the
MB σy . In this way, the three conferees always obtain
the correlated outcomes of their measurements on the
samples if there is no eavesdropper, similar to the two-
step protocol [18] and BBM92 QKD protocol [3]. In a
noise channel, they can obtain securely a short sequence
of GHZ states with entanglement purification.
(2) The three conferees encrypt and decrypt their se-
cret message directly with their quantum key. In detail,
a conferee, say Alice wants to send her secret message to
the other two conferees, Bob and Charlie. She first pre-
pares ordered N traveling particles ST : [T1, T2, . . . , TN ],
and then encrypts the j-th (j = 1, 2, . . . , N) traveling
particle Tj by using a controlled-not (CNOT) gate with
the particle Aj in her quantum key, shown in Fig.1.
Suppose the state of a traveling particle Tj is |χ〉T =
α|0〉 + β|1〉. Here |χ〉T ∈ {|0〉, |1〉}, i.e., αβ = 0. After
the CNOT operation done by Alice with the particle Aj
as the control qubit and the traveling particle Tj as the
target qubit, the state of the quantum system composed
of the particles Aj , Bj , Cj and Tj becomes
|ϕ〉ABCT = 1√
2
(α|0〉A|0〉B|0〉C |0〉T + β|0〉A|0〉B|0〉C |1〉T
+ α|1〉A|1〉B|1〉C |1〉T + β|1〉A|1〉B|1〉C |0〉T ).
(4)
Alice sends the traveling particles ST to Bob. For
reading out the information on the traveling particles
ST , Bob prepares a sequence of auxiliary particles Sb :
[b1, b2, . . . , bN ] whose states are initially |i〉b = |0〉, and
takes a CNOT gate on an auxiliary particle bj and a par-
ticle Bj in the quantum key by using the particle Bj as
the control qubit. Moreover, Bob takes another CNOT
gate on the traveling particle Tj and the auxiliary parti-
cle bj by using the traveling particle as the control qubit.
Thus the state of the auxiliary particle bj is changed into
the one |f〉b as the same as the original state of the trav-
eling particle Tj. Whether the state |χ〉T is |0〉 or |1〉
which represent the bit values 0 and 1 in the secret mes-
sage respectively, Bob can read out this information with
a measurement σz on the auxiliary particle bj . Simulta-
neously, Bob sends the traveling particles ST to a next
conferee, say Charlie.
Certainly, on one hand, Charlie can also do the same
operations as those done by Bob to read out the informa-
tion about Alice’s secret message, shown in Fig.1. On the
other hand, Charlie can measure the traveling particles
ST after he takes a CNOT gate on each traveling parti-
cle Tj and the particle Cj in the quantum key by using
the particle Cj as the control qubit. As all the quan-
tum systems in the quantum key are in the GHZ state
|ψ〉ABC = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)ABC, Charlie can recover the
original state of each traveling particle Tj and then read
out the information about Alice’s message directly.
(3) The three conferees use their quantum key repeat-
edly to encrypt and decrypt their secret message in next
round if they confirm that their quantum communica-
tion is secure. For checking the security of their quantum
communication, the three conferees can choose a subset
of quantum systems in their quantum key as samples to
analyse their error rate, same as the process for sharing a
sequence of GHZ states securely in the step 1. Certainly,
the new quantum key is shorter a little than the original
one.
This MQRSC protocol is secure if the quantum key is
secure as it is just a quantum one-time pad cryto-system
[1, 19] in this time. None can read out the secret message
carried by the traveling particles ST if he does not know
the information about the quantum key as each travel-
ing particle Tj is randomly in the states |0〉 and |1〉 after
the conferee Alice encrypts it with her particle Aj and a
CNOT gate, i.e, the density matrix for a traveling parti-
cle T is ρT =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
whether its original state is |0〉
or |1〉. Thus this MQRSC protocol can be made to be
secure.
It is straightforward to generalize these two MQSRC
schemes to the case with M legitimate conferees, say Al-
ice, Bob, Charlie, . . ., and Mac. For the first MQSRC
scheme, Alice, in this time, prepares an M -particle GHZ
state
|Ψ〉AB...M = 1√
2
(|000 . . . 0〉+ |111 . . .1)AB...M , (5)
and sends the particles B, C, . . ., andM to Bob, Charlie,
. . ., and Mac, respectively. Each of the conferees takes
the MBs σz and σx to measure his particle with the prob-
abilities 1−p and p, respectively. Similar to the case with
three conferees, the probability that all the conferees ob-
tain the same outcomes with the MB σz in principle is
(1− p)M . Then the probability that the M remote con-
ferees obtain their raw key, p′rk without eavesdroppers
is
p′rk = (1− M
√
r
2
)Mp′tp
′
d, (6)
where p′t and p
′
d are the total probabilities of the trans-
mission among the M conferees and their detectors, re-
spectively. Here
p′t =
M∏
l=2
p′tl, p
′
d =
M∏
l=1
p′dl, (7)
where p′dl ≤ 1 is the probability of the detector of the l-
th conferee, p′tl < 1 is the probability of the transmission
between the (l − 1)-th conferee and the l-th conferee.
Obviously, the probability p′rk decreases largely with the
increase of the number M .
4For generalizing our second MQRSC scheme to the
case with M conferees, all the conferees should first
share securely a sequence of M -particle GHZ states
|Ψ〉AB...M = 1√
2
(|000 . . .0〉+ |111 . . . 1)AB...M . This task
can be accomplished with the same way as that in the
case with three conferees. In the process of encrypt-
ing and decrypting their secret messages, Alice first en-
crypts her secret message on the traveling particles ST :
[T1, T2, . . . TN ] with the particles SA : [A1, A2, . . . AN ]
and CNOT gates, and then sends the particles ST to
Bob. Bob decrypts the secret message with his auxiliary
particles Sb and the particles SB : [B1, B2, . . . BN ] in the
quantum key, and measures the auxiliary particles with
the MB σz , not the traveling particles ST . He sends the
particles ST to a next conferee, say Charlie, shown in
Fig.1. All the other conferees just repeat the operations
done by Bob except for the last one, Mac. After taking a
CNOT gate on each traveling particle Tj and his particle
Mj in the quantum key by using the particle Mj as the
control qubit, Mac reads out Alice’s message by measur-
ing the traveling particles ST with the MB σz. In order
to use their quantum key repeatedly, all the conferees
should check the security of their quantum communica-
tion by sampling some of the quantum systems in their
quantum key for analysing their error rate, similar to
that in the case with three conferees.
Compared with quantum secret report [32] and quan-
tum broadcast communication [33], each of the legitimate
conferees can send his message to the other conferees, not
the case in which only the agents can send their secret
messages to a boss in a one-way direction [32] or a special
one can send his message to his agents [33]. In our sec-
ond MQRSC scheme, only the traveling particles ST are
transmitted among theM legitimate conferees after they
share securely their quantum key, a short sequence of
GHZ states which can be used repeatedly. As almost all
the particles can be used to transmit the secret message,
the intrinsic efficiency for qubits in these two MQRSC
schemes approaches the maximal value. Thus they both
are optimal.
In summary, we have presented two multiparty quan-
tum remote secret conference schemes with GHZ states.
One is based on the same classical key generated with
M -particle GHZ states and the measurements with two
biased measuring bases. The other is based on encrypting
and decrypting with a quantum key, a sequence of GHZ
states |Ψ〉AB...M = 1√
2
(|000 . . .0〉 + |111 . . .1)AB...M . As
their intrinsic efficiency for qubits approaches the maxi-
mal value, both are optimal.
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